How the TameMyCerts Policy Module for Active Directory Certificate Services (ADCS) can help secure scenarios with Microsoft Intune and other Mobile Device Management (MDM) systems

Companies use Mobile Device Management (MDM) products for managing, configuring and updating mobile devices such as smartphones, tablet computers or desktop systems via the Internet (over-the-air, OTA).

Common mobile device management products are:

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How the TameMyCerts Policy Module for Active Directory Certificate Services (ADCS) can help establish digital signature processes in the company

Nowadays, many companies want to rely on paperless processes to speed up internal approval and signature processes. In times when most employees are working from home, this has become even more important.

Although the Microsoft certification authority is able to implement automatic certificate issuance processes, its ability to influence the content of the certificate is severely limited .

The TameMyCerts Policy Module for Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) allows the definition of extended rules for the Subject Distinguished Name and also the Subject Alternative Name of issued certificates.

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How the TameMyCerts Policy Module for Active Directory Certificate Services (ADCS) can detect and prevent attacks against the ESC6 and ESC7 attack vectors

With the supposedly good intention of making it possible to issue such certificate requests with a SAN, unfortunately far too many guides advise enabling the EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 flag on the certification authority.

If this flag is enabled, a very large attack surface is offered, as any enrollee can now instruct the certification authority to issue certificates with any content. This type of attack is known in the security scene as ESC6 and ESC7 .

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Automatically enter DNS names in the Subject Alternative Name (SAN) of issued certificates - with the TameMyCerts Policy Module for Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS)

With the Chromium project and products based on it such as Google Chrome and Microsoft Edge, Google has moved to enforce RFC 2818 , adopted in 2000, and to no longer trust certificates that no longer fulfill this requirement.

For us, the following sentence is of great significance:

If a subjectAltName extension of type dNSName is present, that MUST be used as the identity. Otherwise, the (most specific) Common Name field in the Subject field of the certificate MUST be used. Although the use of the Common Name is existing practice, it is deprecated and Certification Authorities are encouraged to use the dNSName instead

— https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2818

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Change the Subject Alternative Name (SAN) of a certificate before it is issued - but do it securely!

On the internet, there are unfortunately far too many instructions (the big players are not excluded from this , not even Microsoft itself or the grandmaster Komar ), which fatally recommend that the flag EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 should be set on the certification authority - supposedly to be able to issue certificates with Subject Alternative Name (SAN) extension for manually submitted certificate requests.

Unfortunately, this procedure is not only unnecessary, it also has some unpleasant side effects, which in the worst case can help an attacker to take over the entire Active Directory forest .

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Sending S/MIME encrypted messages with Outlook for iOS is not possible: "There's a problem with one of your S/MIME encryption certificates."

Assume the following scenario:

There's a problem with one of your S/MIME encryption certificates. Contact your IT help desk for more info.
Es gibt ein Problem mit einem ihrer S/MIME-Verschlüsselungszertifikate. Wenden Sie sich für weitere Informationen an Ihren IT-Helpdesk.

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Logons via the Network Policy Server (NPS) fail with reason "Authentication failed due to a user credentials mismatch. Either the user name provided does not map to an existing user account or the password was incorrect."

Assume the following scenario:

  • A certificate-based logon is performed with user or computer accounts to log them on to a wireless (IEEE 802.11 or Wireless LAN) or wired network (IEEE 802.3), or to a remote access connection (e.g. DirectAccess, Routing and Remote Access (RAS), Always on VPN ).
  • As a server for authentication, authorization and accounting (AAA), the company uses the Network Policy Server (NPS) from Microsoft.
  • Logging on to the network is no longer possible.
  • The Network Policy Server logs the following event when a logon attempt is made:
Network Policy Server denied access to a user. [...] Authentication failed due to a user credentials mismatch. Either the user name provided does not map to an existing user account or the password was incorrect.
Der Netzwerkrichtlinienserver hat einem Benutzer den Zugriff verweigert. [...] Authentifizierungsfehler aufgrund der Nichtübereinstimmung von Benutzeranmeldeinformationen. Der angegebene Benutzername ist keinem vorhandenen Benutzerkonto zugeordnet, oder das Kennwort war falsch.

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Subsequent archiving of private keys

For the encryption of email messages, companies typically use the Secure / Multipurpose Internet Message Extensions (S/MIME) standard and provide their users with appropriate certificates for this purpose.

An important aspect here is that the users' private keys should be secured centrally - in contrast to the signing certificates that are otherwise mostly used. Incoming messages are encrypted for a specific private key and can only be decrypted again by this key . Thus a backup of these keys must absolutely be available - this is also indispensable for synchronization to mobile devices . For this purpose, the Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services offer the private key archival function.

But what if private key archival has not been set up and users have already requested corresponding certificates?

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Requesting certificates for endpoints managed with Microsoft Intune

In a networked world, it has become standard to work from anywhere, and also to work with mobile end devices such as smartphones or tablets in addition to classic desktop computers. Such end devices are usually managed by Mobile Device Management (MDM) systems such as Microsoft Intune.

In most cases, users of mobile devices need digital certificates to prove their identity in order to gain access to corporate resources. Thus, it is necessary to provide these devices with an automatable yet secure interface for requesting these certificates.

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Transferring S/MIME certificates to Microsoft Intune

In a modern networked world, the confidential transmission of messages in the corporate environment is essential for business success. Despite its age , it is still impossible to imagine modern corporate communications without e-mail. However, its use has changed significantly over the decades.

Nowadays, it is common to be able to read and write business e-mails on mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets. Such end devices are usually managed with Mobile Device Management (MDM) systems such as Microsoft Intune.

To encrypt e-mail messages, companies typically use the Secure / Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) standard and provide their users with the corresponding certificates. How do these certificates get to the end devices of the users in a scalable way?

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Details of the event with ID 41 of the source Microsoft-Windows-Kerberos-Key-Distribution-Center

Event Source:Microsoft-Windows-Kerberos-Key-Distribution-Center
Event ID:41 (0x80000029)
Event log:System
Event type:Warning or error
Event text (English):The Key Distribution Center (KDC) encountered a user certificate that was valid but contained a different SID than the user to which it mapped. As a result, the request involving the certificate failed. See https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2189925 to learn more. User: %1 User SID: %2 Certificate Subject: %3 Certificate Issuer: %4 Certificate Serial Number: %5 Certificate Thumbprint: %6 Certificate SID: %7
Event text (German):Der Schlüsselverteilungscenter (KDC) hat ein gültiges Benutzerzertifikat gefunden, das jedoch eine andere SID enthielt als der Benutzer, dem es zugeordnet ist. Dies hat zur Folge, dass bei der Anforderung, die das Zertifikat betrifft, ein Fehler aufgetreten ist. Weitere Informationen finden Sie unter https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2189925 . Benutzer: %1 Benutzer-SID: %2 Zertifikatantragsteller: %3 Zertifikataussteller: %4 Seriennummer des Zertifikats: %5 Zertifikatfingerabdruck: %6 Zertifikat-SID: %7

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Details of the event with ID 40 of the source Microsoft-Windows-Kerberos-Key-Distribution-Center

Event Source:Microsoft-Windows-Kerberos-Key-Distribution-Center
Event ID:40 (0x80000028)
Event log:System
Event type:Warning or error
Event text (English):The Key Distribution Center (KDC) encountered a user certificate that was valid but could not be mapped to a user in a secure way (such as via explicit mapping, key trust mapping, or a SID). The certificate also predated the user it mapped to, so it was rejected. See https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2189925 to learn more. User: %1 Certificate Subject: %2 Certificate Issuer: %3 Certificate Serial Number: %4 Certificate Thumbprint: %5 Certificate Issuance Time: %6 Account Creation Time: %7
Event text (German):Der Schlüsselverteilungscenter (KDC) hat ein gültiges Benutzerzertifikat gefunden, das jedoch keinem Benutzer auf sichere Weise zugeordnet werden konnte (z. B. über eine explizite Zuordnung, eine Schlüsselvertrauenszuordnung oder eine SID). Das Zertifikat hat auch dem Benutzer vorangestellt, dem es zugeordnet ist, weshalb es abgelehnt wurde. Weitere Informationen finden Sie unter https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2189925 . Benutzer: %1 Zertifikatantragsteller: %2 Zertifikataussteller: %3 Zertifikatseriennummer: %4 Zertifikatfingerabdruck: %5 Zertifikatausstellungszeit: %6 Erstellungszeit des Kontos: %7

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Details of the event with ID 39 of the source Microsoft-Windows-Kerberos-Key-Distribution-Center

Event Source:Microsoft-Windows-Kerberos-Key-Distribution-Center
Event ID:39 (0x80000027)
Event log:System
Event type:Warning or error
Event text (English):The Key Distribution Center (KDC) encountered a user certificate that was valid but could not be mapped to a user in a secure way (such as via explicit mapping, key trust mapping, or a SID). Such certificates should either be replaced or mapped directly to the user via explicit mapping. See https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2189925 to learn more. User: %1 Certificate Subject: %2 Certificate Issuer: %3 Certificate Serial Number: %4 Certificate Thumbprint: %5
Event text (German):Der Schlüsselverteilungscenter (KDC) hat ein gültiges Benutzerzertifikat gefunden, das jedoch keinem Benutzer auf sichere Weise zugeordnet werden konnte (z. B. über eine explizite Zuordnung, eine Schlüsselvertrauenszuordnung oder eine SID). Solche Zertifikate sollten entweder ersetzt oder dem Benutzer über eine explizite Zuordnung direkt zugeordnet werden. Weitere Informationen finden Sie unter https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2189925 . Benutzer: %1 Zertifikatantragsteller: %2 Zertifikataussteller: %3 Zertifikatseriennummer: %4 Zertifikatfingerabdruck: %5

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Character encoding in the Subject Distinguished Name of certificate requests and issued certificates

Usually, the encoding of characters and strings in certificates is not a topic of great interest to the users of a PKI. However, there are cases where the default settings of the certification authority do not provide the desired results.

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