Requests for certificates using ML-DSA-based keys fail with the error message "The parameter is incorrect. 0x80070057 (WIN32: 87 ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER)"

Assume the following scenario:

  • You try to request certificates using the ML-DSA algorithm.
  • The request fails with the following error message:
The parameter is incorrect. 0x80070057 (WIN32: 87 ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER)

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Automatically add the Security Identifier (SID) certificate extension to certificates requested via Mobile Device Management (MDM) - with the TameMyCerts Policy Module for Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services (ADCS)

After several postponements, Microsoft finally decided that the Changes to Certificate Issuance and Certificate-Based Logon to Active Directory with the May 10, 2022 Patch for Windows Server (KB5014754) should now finally come into force.

Domain controllers will therefore automatically switch to full enforcement mode on February 25, 2025, unless configured otherwise. As of September 2025, it has been announced that deviating settings will no longer apply and there will therefore no longer be an alternative to full enforcement.

The consequence of this is that certificates can only be used for logon via PKInit if they have the new Security Identifier (SID) certificate extension introduced with the patch.

What at first sounds as if this is not a major problem may well become one when you consider that fewer and fewer certificate-based use cases are using classic autoenrollment these days.

How the TameMyCerts Policy Module for the Active Directory Certificate Services can help with this problem is explained in more detail in the following article.

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Smart card logon fails with error message "A certification chain processed correctly, but one of the CA certificates is not trusted by the policy provider. 0x800b0112 (-2146762478 CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDCA)"

Assume the following scenario:

  • The company would like to use smart card logon.
  • The domain controllers are equipped with certificates that can be used for smart card logon .
  • The users are equipped with certificates that can be used for smart card logon.
  • Logon to the domain via smart card fails with the following error message:
A certification chain processed correctly, but one of the CA certificates is not trusted by the policy provider. 0x800b0112 (-2146762478 CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDCA)

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How securing printers can turn into a security disaster - and how the TameMyCerts Policy Module for Active Directory Certificate Services (ADCS) can prevent it

Nowadays, it is essential to protect the authentication of devices on the company network and administrative interfaces. As a rule, digital certificates are used for this purpose.

Printers therefore also generally require digital certificates in order to be operated securely. From a certain number of devices, there is no getting around automatic certificate distribution.

Some printer manufacturers offer centralized management solutions for certificate distribution.

Unfortunately, it has been shown time and again that the secure handling of digital certificates requires a great deal of knowledge, experience and care, which is often not the case.

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Decommissioning of an Active Directory integrated certification authority (Enterprise CA)

There are many instructions for setting up and commissioning IT services. However, the associated instructions for decommissioning are usually forgotten.

The following describes how to correctly decommission a certification authority integrated into Active Directory (Enterprise Certification Authority).

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Logons via the Network Policy Server (NPS) fail with reason "Authentication failed due to a user credentials mismatch. Either the user name provided does not map to an existing user account or the password was incorrect."

Assume the following scenario:

  • A certificate-based logon is performed with user or computer accounts to log them on to a wireless (IEEE 802.11 or Wireless LAN) or wired network (IEEE 802.3), or to a remote access connection (e.g. DirectAccess, Routing and Remote Access (RAS), Always on VPN ).
  • As a server for authentication, authorization and accounting (AAA), the company uses the Network Policy Server (NPS) from Microsoft.
  • Logging on to the network is no longer possible.
  • The Network Policy Server logs the following event when a logon attempt is made:
Network Policy Server denied access to a user. [...] Authentication failed due to a user credentials mismatch. Either the user name provided does not map to an existing user account or the password was incorrect.
Der Netzwerkrichtlinienserver hat einem Benutzer den Zugriff verweigert. [...] Authentifizierungsfehler aufgrund der Nichtübereinstimmung von Benutzeranmeldeinformationen. Der angegebene Benutzername ist keinem vorhandenen Benutzerkonto zugeordnet, oder das Kennwort war falsch.

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Unable to install Network Device Enrollment Service (NDES) at a site with only read-only domain controllers

Assume the following scenario:

  • A Network Device Enrollment Service (NDES) is to be implemented in the network.
  • Only read-only domain controllers (RODC) are located at the Active Directory site of the NDES server.
  • NDES role configuration fails with the following error message:
Failed to add the following certificate templates to the enterprise Active Directory Certificate Service or update security settings on those templates:
EnrollmentAgentOffline 
CEPEncryption
IPSEC(Offline request)
A referral was returned from the server. 0x8007202b (WIN32:8235 ERROR_DS_REFERRAL)

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Details of the event with ID 41 of the source Microsoft-Windows-Kerberos-Key-Distribution-Center

Event Source:Microsoft-Windows-Kerberos-Key-Distribution-Center
Event ID:41 (0x80000029)
Event log:System
Event type:Warning or error
Event text (English):The Key Distribution Center (KDC) encountered a user certificate that was valid but contained a different SID than the user to which it mapped. As a result, the request involving the certificate failed. See https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2189925 to learn more. User: %1 User SID: %2 Certificate Subject: %3 Certificate Issuer: %4 Certificate Serial Number: %5 Certificate Thumbprint: %6 Certificate SID: %7
Event text (German):Der Schlüsselverteilungscenter (KDC) hat ein gültiges Benutzerzertifikat gefunden, das jedoch eine andere SID enthielt als der Benutzer, dem es zugeordnet ist. Dies hat zur Folge, dass bei der Anforderung, die das Zertifikat betrifft, ein Fehler aufgetreten ist. Weitere Informationen finden Sie unter https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2189925 . Benutzer: %1 Benutzer-SID: %2 Zertifikatantragsteller: %3 Zertifikataussteller: %4 Seriennummer des Zertifikats: %5 Zertifikatfingerabdruck: %6 Zertifikat-SID: %7

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Details of the event with ID 40 of the source Microsoft-Windows-Kerberos-Key-Distribution-Center

Event Source:Microsoft-Windows-Kerberos-Key-Distribution-Center
Event ID:40 (0x80000028)
Event log:System
Event type:Warning or error
Event text (English):The Key Distribution Center (KDC) encountered a user certificate that was valid but could not be mapped to a user in a secure way (such as via explicit mapping, key trust mapping, or a SID). The certificate also predated the user it mapped to, so it was rejected. See https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2189925 to learn more. User: %1 Certificate Subject: %2 Certificate Issuer: %3 Certificate Serial Number: %4 Certificate Thumbprint: %5 Certificate Issuance Time: %6 Account Creation Time: %7
Event text (German):Der Schlüsselverteilungscenter (KDC) hat ein gültiges Benutzerzertifikat gefunden, das jedoch keinem Benutzer auf sichere Weise zugeordnet werden konnte (z. B. über eine explizite Zuordnung, eine Schlüsselvertrauenszuordnung oder eine SID). Das Zertifikat hat auch dem Benutzer vorangestellt, dem es zugeordnet ist, weshalb es abgelehnt wurde. Weitere Informationen finden Sie unter https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2189925 . Benutzer: %1 Zertifikatantragsteller: %2 Zertifikataussteller: %3 Zertifikatseriennummer: %4 Zertifikatfingerabdruck: %5 Zertifikatausstellungszeit: %6 Erstellungszeit des Kontos: %7

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Details of the event with ID 39 of the source Microsoft-Windows-Kerberos-Key-Distribution-Center

Event Source:Microsoft-Windows-Kerberos-Key-Distribution-Center
Event ID:39 (0x80000027)
Event log:System
Event type:Warning or error
Event text (English):The Key Distribution Center (KDC) encountered a user certificate that was valid but could not be mapped to a user in a secure way (such as via explicit mapping, key trust mapping, or a SID). Such certificates should either be replaced or mapped directly to the user via explicit mapping. See https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2189925 to learn more. User: %1 Certificate Subject: %2 Certificate Issuer: %3 Certificate Serial Number: %4 Certificate Thumbprint: %5
Event text (German):Der Schlüsselverteilungscenter (KDC) hat ein gültiges Benutzerzertifikat gefunden, das jedoch keinem Benutzer auf sichere Weise zugeordnet werden konnte (z. B. über eine explizite Zuordnung, eine Schlüsselvertrauenszuordnung oder eine SID). Solche Zertifikate sollten entweder ersetzt oder dem Benutzer über eine explizite Zuordnung direkt zugeordnet werden. Weitere Informationen finden Sie unter https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2189925 . Benutzer: %1 Zertifikatantragsteller: %2 Zertifikataussteller: %3 Zertifikatseriennummer: %4 Zertifikatfingerabdruck: %5

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List of certificate use cases for which compatibility with elliptic curve (ECC)-based keys is known

As computing power becomes increasingly available, the need to use stronger cryptographic keys also increases. In this course, there is often a need (for example, because the keys have to be protected by a Trusted Platform Module) to use keys based on elliptic curves (ECC) . For their use, it is essential that compatibility with the intended use cases is ensured.

Below is a list of use cases for which I know the compatibility.

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Logon error with Windows Hello for Business: "Contact your system administrator and tell them that the KDC certificate could not be validated."

Assume the following scenario:

  • The company is using Windows Hello for Business.
  • Users receive the following error message when logging on to the client:
Sign-in failed. Contact your system administrator and tell them that the KDC certificate could not be validated. Additional information may be available in the system event log.

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Basics: Authentication procedures for the Internet Information Services (IIS)

The Active Directory Certificate Services offer a number of web-based add-on interfaces (Network Device Enrollment Service (NDES) , Certificate Enrollment Policy Web Service (CEP) , Certificate Enrollment Web Service (CES) , Certification Authority Web Enrollment (CAWE) .

The Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS) are thus almost indispensable for a Microsoft PKI. Each of the web-based interfaces (and also in-house developments) bring their own unique challenges in terms of authentication procedures and their implementation.

The following article should bring a little clarity to the topic.

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Changes to Certificate Issuance and Certificate-Based Logon to Active Directory with the May 10, 2022 Patch for Windows Server (KB5014754)

With the May 10, 2022 patch, Microsoft is attempting to close a vulnerability in Active Directory that affects certificate-based logon (commonly known as PKINIT or also smart card logon ).

The update changes both the behavior of the certification authority as well as the behavior of Active Directory when processing certificate-based logons.

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About the "Build this from Active Directory information" option for certificate templates

When configuring a certificate template, one must decide on the intended certificate content, i.e., among other things, which identities are confirmed by the certificates and how they are mapped.

In the "Subject Name" tab of the certificate template configuration dialog, you can configure how the identity confirmed by the certificate is mapped.

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