How securing printers can turn into a security disaster - and how the TameMyCerts Policy Module for Active Directory Certificate Services (ADCS) can prevent it

Nowadays, it is essential to protect the authentication of devices on the company network and administrative interfaces. As a rule, digital certificates are used for this purpose.

Printers therefore also generally require digital certificates in order to be operated securely. From a certain number of devices, there is no getting around automatic certificate distribution.

Some printer manufacturers offer centralized management solutions for certificate distribution.

Unfortunately, it has been shown time and again that the secure handling of digital certificates requires a great deal of knowledge, experience and care, which is often not the case.

Continue reading „Wie das Absichern von Druckern zum Security-Desaster werden kann – und wie das TameMyCerts Policy Modul für Active Directory Certificate Services (ADCS) diese verhindern kann“

How the TameMyCerts Policy Module for Active Directory Certificate Services (ADCS) can detect and prevent attacks against the ESC6 and ESC7 attack vectors

With the supposedly good intention of making it possible to issue such certificate requirements with a SAN, guess unfortunately much at many Instructions  to set the flag on the certification authority EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 to activate.

If this flag is activated, a very large attack surface is offered, as any applicant can now instruct the certification authority to issue certificates with any content. This type of attack is known in the security scene as ESC6 and ESC7 known.

Continue reading „Wie das TameMyCerts Policy Modul für Active Directory Certificate Services (ADCS) Angriffe gegen die ESC6 und ESC7 Angriffsvektoren erkennen und verhindern kann“

Automatically enter DNS names in the Subject Alternate Name (SAN) of issued certificates - with the TameMyCerts Policy Module for Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services (ADCS)

Google is a major player with the Chromium project and products based on it such as Google Chrome and Microsoft Edge have moved to implement the RFC 2818 and to no longer trust certificates that no longer fulfill this requirement.

For us, the following sentence is of great explosiveness:

If a subjectAltName extension of type dNSName is present, that MUST be used as the identity. Otherwise, the (most specific) Common Name field in the Subject field of the certificate MUST be used. Although the use of the Common Name is existing practice, it is deprecated and Certification Authorities are encouraged to use the dNSName instead

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2818
Continue reading „DNS-Namen automatisch in den Subject Alternate Name (SAN) ausgestellter Zertifikate eintragen – mit dem TameMyCerts Policy Modul für Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services (ADCS)“

Change the Subject Alternative Name (SAN) of a certificate before it is issued - but do it securely!

In net circulate unfortunately much at many Instructions (also the big players are not excluded from this, not even Microsoft itself or the Grand Master Komar), which fatally recommend that the flag EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 should be set on the certification authority - supposedly to be able to issue certificates with Subject Alternative Name (SAN) extension for manually submitted certificate requests.

Unfortunately, this procedure is not only unnecessary, it also has some unpleasant side effects, which in the worst case can help an attacker to take over the entire Active Directory structure.

Continue reading „Den Subject Alternative Name (SAN) eines Zertifikats vor dessen Ausstellung verändern – aber sicher!“

Signing certificates bypassing the certification authority - solely using built-in tools

In the article "Signing certificates bypassing the certification authority"I described how an attacker with administrative rights on the certification authority can generate a logon certificate for administrative accounts of the domain by bypassing the certification authority software, i.e. by directly using the private key of the certification authority.

In the previous article I described the PSCertificateEnrollment Powershell Module is used to demonstrate the procedure. Microsoft supplies with certreq and certutil However, perfectly suitable pentesting tools are already included with the operating system ex works.

Continue reading „Signieren von Zertifikaten unter Umgehung der Zertifizierungsstelle – allein mit Bordmitteln“

Signing certificates bypassing the certification authority

Time and again in discussions about the security of a certification authority, it comes up that abuse of the certification authority could be contained by its security settings.

However, the fact that the integrity of a certification authority is directly tied to its key material and can therefore also be compromised by it is not obvious at first glance.

one must think of the certification authority software as a kind of management around the key material. For example, the software provides a Online interface for Certificate Enrollment takes care of the authentication of the enrollees, the automated execution of signature operations (issuing certificates and Brevocation lists) and their logging (Certification Authority Database, Audit log, Event log).

However, signature operations require nothing more than the private key of the certification authority. The following example shows how an attacker, given access to the certification authority's private key, can generate and issue certificates without the certification authority software and its security mechanisms being aware of this.

With such a certificate, it would even be possible in the worst case, take over the Active Directory forest undetected.

Continue reading „Signieren von Zertifikaten unter Umgehung der Zertifizierungsstelle“

Configuring a Certificate Template for Domain Controllers

Even with a certificate template for domain controllers that is supposedly simple to configure, there are a few things to keep in mind.

Continue reading „Konfigurieren einer Zertifikatvorlage für Domänencontroller“

Attack vector on Active Directory directory service via smartcard logon mechanism

In simple terms, public key cryptography can be reduced to the assumption that the private part of each key pair is known only to its owner.

A certification authority is responsible for the correct identification of users, computers or resources. Its issued certificates are therefore granted a trust status because all participants assume that their private key is known only to it.

If an attacker succeeds in gaining knowledge of a certification authority's private key, or at least Perform signatures using the private key, the integrity of the certification authority is no longer guaranteed.

Continue reading „Angriffsvektor auf den Active Directory Verzeichnisdienst über den Smartcard Logon Mechanismus“

Active Directory forest compromised by EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 flag

In net circulate unfortunately much at many Instructions (also the big players are not excluded from this, not even Microsoft itself or the Grand Master Komar), which fatally recommends that the EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 flag should be set on the certification authority - supposedly to be able to issue Subject Alternative Name (SAN) extension certificates for manually submitted certificate requests.

Unfortunately, this approach is not only unnecessary, it also has some unpleasant side effects, which in the worst case can help an attacker to take over the entire Active Directory forest.

Continue reading „Gefährdung der Active Directory Gesamtstruktur durch das Flag EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2“
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