Details of the event with ID 4899 of the source Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing

Event Source:Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing
Event ID:4899 (0x1323)
Event log:Security
Event type:Information
Event text (English):A Certificate Services template was updated. %1 v%2 (Schema V%3) %4 %5 Template Change Information: Old Template Content: %8 New Template Content: %7 Additional Information: Domain Controller: %6
Event text (German):Die Zertifikatdienstvorlage wurde aktualisiert. %1 v%2 (Schema V%3) %4 %5 Vorlageninformationen: Vorlageninhalt: %7 Sicherheitsbeschreibung: %8 Zusätzliche Informationen: Domänencontroller: %6

Parameter

The parameters contained in the event text are filled with the following fields:

  • %1: TemplateInternalName (win:UnicodeString)
  • %2: TemplateVersion (win:UnicodeString)
  • %3: TemplateSchemaVersion (win:UnicodeString)
  • %4: TemplateOID (win:UnicodeString)
  • %5: TemplateDSObjectFQDN (win:UnicodeString)
  • %6: DCDNSName (win:UnicodeString)
  • %7: NewTemplateContent (win:UnicodeString)
  • %8: OldTemplateContent (win:UnicodeString)

In contrast to operational events, which are often understood under the term "monitoring", auditing for the certification authority is the configuration of logging of security-relevant events.

Example events

 A Certificate Services template was updated. 
  
 ADCSLaborBenutzer v101.81 (Schema V2) 
 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.21.8.6301991.2938543.412570.1725121.735828.231.4136173.9322655 
 CN=ADCSLaborBenutzer,CN=Certificate Templates,CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=intra,DC=adcslabor,DC=de 
  
 Template Change Information: 
 	Old Template Content:	
 msPKI-Template-Minor-Revision = 79
 
 msPKI-Certificate-Policy =
   1.3.6.1.4.1.311.21.8.6301991.2938543.412570.1725121.735828.231.12718143.3882922
  
 	New Template Content:		
 msPKI-Template-Minor-Revision = 81
 
 msPKI-Certificate-Policy =
  
  
 Additional Information: 
 	Domain Controller:	DC01.intra.adcslabor.de 

Description

Do you know TameMyCerts? TameMyCerts is an add-on for the Microsoft certification authority (Active Directory Certificate Services). It extends the function of the certification authority and enables the application of rule sets to realize the secure automation of certificate issuance. TameMyCerts is unique in the Microsoft ecosystem, has already proven itself in countless companies around the world and is available under a free license. It can be downloaded via GitHub and used free of charge. Professional maintenance is also offered.

In order for the certification authorities to log the security setting changes to certificate templates, the following command must be executed once on each certification authority:

 certutil -setreg policy\EditFlags +EDITF_AUDITCERTTEMPLATELOAD 

Added Extended Key Usages usable for privileged actions to a certificate template

If an attacker succeeds in issuing certificates that are usable for Smart Card Logon (this is possible with the Extended Key Usages Smart Card Logon and Client Authentication), he could impersonate other users including administrative accounts.

Certificate template is changed so that the enrollee can specify the identity and/or approval by a certificate manager is disabled

Usually, the identities in a certificate are built by the policy module of the certification authority from the Active Directory, so that the enrollee has no influence on this and impersonation of other identities is not possible. However, there are exceptional cases in which this would be necessary (web server). The policy module is notified of this by setting the CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT flag in the template. Usually such certificate requests should then be manually checked and approved, which is communicated to the policy module via the CT_FLAG_PEND_ALL_REQUESTS flag. If a template now allows the enrollee to specify the identity or disables manual verification, this should be alerted.

Security assessment

The security assessment is based on the three dimensions of confidentiality, integrity and availability.

If an attacker succeeds in issuing certificates that are usable for Smart Card Logon (this is possible with the Smart Card Logon and Client Authentication Extended Key Usages), he could impersonate other users including administrative accounts. The Smart Card Logon Extended Key Usage should only be required for a few templates (especially Windows Hello for Business). The Client Authentication Extended Key Usage is unfortunately also accepted by domain controllers, and this often occurs in other cases as well. Therefore, a higher number of alerts can be expected here.

Depending on the certificate type, an attacker could gain elevated privileges if he can specify the identity of another user as the enrollee and the certification authority issues the certificate directly. The likelihood of an attacker modifying the template permissions in preparation for such an action is rather low, but a misconfigured template may well be an attractive target for exploitation.

Microsoft's rating

Microsoft evaluates this event in the Securing Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Whitepaper with a severity rating of "Medium".

External sources