Root CA certificates are imported on domain members into the certificate store for intermediate certification authorities

Some will have noticed that the certificate store for intermediate CAs usually also contains certificates for root CAs.

As a rule, this behavior is not critical. In certain cases however, this can also cause problems with applications.

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Restoring certificates from the SMTP Exit Module data

If you restore a certification authority from a backup after a disaster has occurred , you will probably find that certificates were issued in the period between the last backup and the system failure with corresponding data loss.

These certificates are now not stored in the restored certification authority database, so they cannot be restored if needed.

If you are using the SMTP Exit Module, you can at least determine the serial numbers of the certificates from the sent e-mails and revoke them.

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The local certificate store for trusted root certification authorities is not synchronized from Active Directory

Assume the following scenario:

  • A certification authority hierarchy is established in the network and the root certification authority is mapped in the configuration partition of the Active Directory forest.
  • Domain members are configured to run the autoenrollment process to update trusted root certification authorities from the Configuration partition.
  • However, this process does not work for some clients. The root CA certificates are not automatically downloaded and entered into the local trust store.
  • As a consequence certificate requests can fail because, for example, the certification authority hierarchy is not trusted.

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Troubleshooting for automatic certificate request (autoenrollment) via RPC/DCOM (MS-WCCE)

Assume the following scenario:

  • A certificate template is configured for automatic certificate request (autoenrollment).
  • The certificate template is published on a certification authority (Enterprise Certification Authority) integrated into Active Directory.
  • However, the users or computers configured for automatic certificate request do not request certificates as intended.

The following is a troubleshooting guide.

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No certificate is requested via autoenrollment if a user is connected via Virtual Private Network (VPN)

Assume the following scenario:

  • A user works remotely via Virtual Private Network (VPN)
  • Actually, a certificate should be requested via autoenrollment, but this is not done
  • A connection test (certutil -ping) to the certification authority throws the following error message:
Server could not be reached: The RPC server is unavailable. 0x800706ba (WIN32: 1722 RPC_S_SERVER_UNAVAILABLE) -- (31ms)

CertUtil: -ping command FAILED: 0x800706ba (WIN32: 1722 RPC_S_SERVER_UNAVAILABLE)
CertUtil: The RPC server is unavailable.

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Revocation of an issued certificate fails with error message "The data is invalid. 0x8007000d (WIN32: 13 ERROR_INVALID_DATA)"

Assume the following scenario:

  • A certificate is revoked via the command line (certutil -revoke).
  • The operation fails with the following error message:
ICertAdmin::RevokeCertificate: The data is invalid. 0x8007000d (WIN32: 13 ERROR_INVALID_DATA)

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Microsoft Outlook: Find out recipient certificates for S/MIME encrypted mails

For troubleshooting e-mail messages encrypted using Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME), the encrypted part of a message can be exported. See article "Microsoft Outlook: Extracting an encrypted S/MIME message from an email ".

To find out with which certificates a message has been encrypted, you can proceed as follows...

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Microsoft Outlook: View which algorithm was used for an S/MIME encrypted or signed email

Below is a description of where it is possible to view which symmetric algorithm was used to encrypt an email received, and which hash algorithm was used for a signed email.

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Details of the event with ID 74 of the source Microsoft-Windows-CertificationAuthority

Event Source:Microsoft-Windows-CertificationAuthority
Event ID:74 (0x4A)
Event log:Application
Event type:Error
Symbolic Name:MSG_E_BASE_CRL_PUBLICATION_HOST_NAME
Event text (English):Active Directory Certificate Services could not publish a Base CRL for key %1 to the following location on server %4: %2. %3.%5%6
Event text (German):Es konnte keine Basis-Zertifikatsperrliste für den Schlüssel %1 an folgendem Ort auf dem Server "%4" veröffentlicht werden: %2. %3.%5%6

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Restrict Extended Key Usage (EKU) for imported root certification authority certificates

A useful hardening measure for certification authorities is to restrict the certification authority certificates so that they are only trusted for the extended key usages (Extended Key Usage) actually issued.

In the event of a compromise of the certification authority, the damage is then limited to these Extended Key Usages. The smart card logon extended key usage would then only be present in the certification authority certificate of the certification authority that actually issues such certificates.

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Windows Defender detects certutil as malware (Win32/Ceprolad.A)

Assume the following scenario:

certutil -ping -kerberos -config "https://{Servername}/ADPolicyProvider_CEP_Kerberos/service.svc/CEP" CEP 

The certutil command is incorrectly detected by Windows Defender or Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection as Win32/Ceprolad.A.

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Performing a functional test for a certification authority

After installing a certification authority, after migrating to a new server, or after more extensive maintenance work, an extensive functional test should be performed to ensure that all components of the certification authority are working as desired.

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Publishing a certificate revocation list (CRL) to an Active Directory CRL distribution point (CDP)

Sometimes it is necessary for a certificate issued by a certification authority to be withdrawn from circulation even before its expiration date. To make this possible, a certification authority maintains a certificate revocation list. This is a signed file with a relatively short expiration date, which is used in combination with the certificate to check its validity.

In some cases (for example, with an offline certification authority, or if non-standard LDAP CRL distribution points have been configured), the certificate revocation list must be manually published to Active Directory.

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